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ABSTRACT
What makes the United States one of the most prosperous and
safest nations in the modern world? Perhaps it is the durable economy,
the strong military force, or the Constitutional protections. What most
Americans take for granted, however, is something people in many
nations base their entire lives around: safe, clean water. Promulgated in
1972, the original Clean Water Act has been opposed and amended over
the course of forty years. No provision, however, has been as hotly
contested as the § 404 program for “dredge and fill” permits.
Specifically, this section led to divisions on what constitutes “water”
that is subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction and what does not.
Hoping to solve the confusion once and for all, the EPA’s “Clean Water
Rule” was published in 2015. The Rule, however, was immediately met
with litigation and was hit with a nationwide stay by the Sixth Circuit.
This article is the first to collectively address the pending
arguments against the Rule while arguing that the adoption of Justice
Kennedy’s significant nexus test was the best option. When the Sixth
Circuit makes its decision on the merits, the decision will likely make it
to the Supreme Court. The Court should find that contrary to many
allegations, the Rule does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act,
the Commerce Clause, or the Clear Statement Canon. Further, by
applying the 2016 Hawkes Co. ruling, the Court should be able to ease
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the minds of the Rule’s opponents while confirming the Rule on the
merits.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether for drinking, swimming, farming, or plumbing, the United
States takes its water systems for granted. More than forty years after
the creation of the Clean Water Act, the jurisdiction of the Act has never
been more contested.
Central to the rights of American citizens is the right own, use, and
enjoy property without interference from the federal government. No
man wants the federal government stepping on his land, implementing
regulations, requiring permits, and potentially imposing fines. Yet, this
is all part of the risk for landowning Americans when dealing with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
From its original designation of “navigable waters,” to its definition
of “waters of the United States,” courts have battled with the proper
jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act since its inception.1 In an attempt to
create a clear-cut rule in 2015, the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers
(the Corps) looked to a 2006 opinion of Justice Kennedy. After years of
confusion, the EPA adopted the “Clean Water Rule,” and codified the
new rule in the Code of Federal Regulations in August 2015.2
The new rule was immediately met with opposition from states,
businesses, and farmers alike, primarily claiming that the rule
constitutes an arbitrary and capricious use of discretion. The suits
opposing the new rule were consolidated before the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 3 Pending further determinations on the merits, the Sixth
Circuit issued a nationwide stay of the new rule. The stay of the Rule
was unnecessary and the stay must be lifted.
The new Clean Water Rule follows very closely to Justice
Kennedy’s 2006 concurring opinion in Rapanos v. United States.4 While
the rule may seem to be a giant federal overreach to many in the general
public, the rule follows Supreme Court precedent and fits perfectly in
line with the goals of the Clean Water Act.
The regulation of the nation’s waters is vital to the overall health of
the American people as well as the economy. In 2016, approximately
1

33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7).
33 C.F.R. § 328.
3
See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015). There is some controversy
regarding whether the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear all of the claims and
especially to issue a nationwide stay. Unlike the Clean Air Act, which mandates that all
litigation takes place in the D.C. Circuit, the Clean Water Act has no such requirement.
4
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
2
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117 million Americans, or one in three people, get their drinking water
from streams that are protected by the Rule. 5 Further, the American
lifestyle depends on consistently clean water. Beyond drinking, America
needs clean water for manufacturing, farming, tourism, recreation,
energy production, and many other economic sectors.6
While overreach of the federal government is a major concern for
many, the need for clean water is a concern for all. Despite the seeming
overreach in Kennedy’s opinion, the EPA’s adoption of the “significant
nexus test” is essential to the future of America’s water systems.
Unfortunately, this rule will continue to be challenged until the Supreme
Court grants certiorari for the issue and determines that the agency’s
regulation is not arbitrary or capricious. This article will explain why the
“significant nexus test” is the best method for determining the Act’s
jurisdiction based on scientific evidence, Supreme Court precedent, and
the goal of the Act. In conjunction, this article will survey and denounce
the common claims against the Rule. Further, this article is the first to
argue that the Rule should please both sides, as it accomplishes the goal
of the Act and when combined with the recent Hawkes case, is less
overreaching and more scientifically sound than any other alternative.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Clean Water Act
The modern Clean Water Act is the result of several enactments
over the course of over 100 years, culminating in an ambitious plan in
the environmental decade of the 1970s. The controversial history of
Section 404 jurisdiction, however, is traced through three major cases.
i. Goals of the Act
The initial goal of the Clean Water Act was overly ambitious: “to
restore and maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters” and to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants by 1985.7 The fight for clean water,
however, started well before the late twentieth century. In 1870, the
5

Clean Water Rule: Streams and Wetlands Matter, available at
https://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/clean-water-rule-streams-and-wetlands-matter.
6
Id.
7
33 U.S.C.A. § 1251. (The goal of eliminating pollution is unattainable, as the
Act itself actually provides permits to pollute).
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Supreme Court decided that Congress had the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate waterways, but only those that could carry
interstate or foreign commerce.8 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
was the first federal law fighting water pollution.9 At a time when the
per se navigability of lakes and rivers was essential to the economy, the
Rivers and Harbors Act ensured the unobstructed passage along United
States waters. To accomplish this, the Rivers and Harbors Act outlawed
any obstructions that impeded the navigation of any waters without
congressional approval (Section 10), prohibited the discharge of
substances from shore or from a floating craft into navigable waters
(Section 13), and provided a way to penalize those who pollute the
nation’s waterways (Section 12).10 It is important to note that the Rivers
and Harbors Act focused solely on navigability of lakes and rivers. The
goal was not necessarily to protect wildlife or the safety of the drinking
water, rather the nation’s economy depended on the navigability of
waters in order to create commerce.
By the mid twentieth century, concerns were growing regarding the
safety of the nation’s drinking water.11 Primarily, the industrial boom of
the early 1900s created concerns that diseases would be spread by the
discharge of sewage into drinking water resources. This increasing fear
led to the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)
in 1948. 12 While great in theory, the FWPCA lacked serious
enforcement. 13 The FWPCA allowed the individual states to control
their own water pollution, but provided an opportunity for a federal

8

See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 403 (codification of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
forbidding excavation or construction in navigable waters without approval of the
Secretary of the Army).
10
See Samuel Worth, Water, Water, Everywhere, and Plenty of Drops to
Regulate: Why the Newly Published WOTUS Rule Does Not Violate the Commerce
Clause, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605, 607. (2016). (citing Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.) (See 33 U.S.C.A. § 406;
Section 12 provided that a violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act was a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of up to $2,500 and/or up to one year imprisonment).
11
The industrial boom of the early 1900s spurred more pollution than the United
States had ever seen, leading to the necessity of stronger environmental regulation.
12
Worth, supra note 11, at 607; see also Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1948, Publ. L. No. 845 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376).
13
Id. (citing Joel M. Gross & Kerri L. Stelcen, Clean Water Act at 6 (2012)).
9
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hearing if a state could not resolve an issue on its own.14 Over twenty
years after the enactment of the FWPCA, however, “only fifty informal
conferences had been held, . . . only four matters [had] proceeded . . . to
the administrative hearing stage,” and only one case had gone to court.15
Although the intent was good, the enforcement of the FWPCA failed,
forcing the nation to look for yet another alternative to protecting its
navigable waters.
In some ways, the industrial boom that led to the necessity of water
pollution control also contributed to the enactment of a better plan, as
scientific knowledge and engineering capabilities advanced. In 1972,
Congress enacted what was essentially a revised version of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.16 This new legislation became known as
the Clean Water Act (the “Act”). The primary goal of the Act was to
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the nation’s waters.”17 For the first time, federal water pollution control
was based on scientific, technology-based standards. The Act hoped to
attain a national water quality that could protect wildlife habitats as well
as humans’ ability to use water for recreational purposes.18 Further, the
Act hoped to increase federal funding of publicly-owned treatment
works, and to develop and implement waste treatment management
planning in the individual states.19
The permit system is the most contested framework of the Clean
Water Act. The Act began funding discharge-eliminating technology
and programs for “non-point source” pollution control.20 As part of this
endeavor, the Act prohibited discharges of any pollutant into the waters
of the United States without express authorization through the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting system.21

14

Worth, supra note 11, at 607; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376; see also Joel M.
Gross & Kerri L. Stelcen, Clean Water Act at 13.
15
Id. (citing Joel M. Gross and Kerri L. Stelcen, Clean Water Act 5, 6 (2012)).
16
Id. See also 33 U.S.C §§ 1251-1274.
17
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
18
Worth, supra note 11, at 607 (citing Gross & Stelcen, 7-8).
19
Gross and Stelcen, at 7-8.
20
Id.
21
Clean Water Act Compliance Monitoring, Envtl. Prot. Agency. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers (the
“Corps”) were made jointly responsible for monitoring compliance with the Act by onsite investigations and enforcement of penalties for unpermitted discharges.
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The Act also made its provisions enforceable by the EPA.22 By setting
uniform, technology-based effluent limitations on the discharge of
pollutants into the nation’s waters, the Act started some controversy
over what could be governed.
In 1977 the Clean Water Act was amended to require the
achievement of “Best Available Technology” or “BAT” limitations for
toxic pollutants and “Best Available Conventional Pollutant Control
Technology” or “BCT” limitations for conventional pollutants by July 1,
1984. 23 These amendments marked a major jump forward, as the
scientific basis for clean water was now in full effect. No longer was the
federal government focused solely on the navigability of waters for the
sake of ships.
The implementation of these scientific-based requirements has
provided visible improvements in the nation’s waterways. The Act has
also, however, created some frustration amongst landowners due to
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act provides the “dredge and fill”
permit program. 24 If a landowner wants to fill in a pond, lake, river,
wetland, etc., the landowner must usually obtain a fill permit from the
EPA and the Corps. This is particularly troublesome when the
landowner desires to fill “wetlands,” or land that is not traditionally
navigable water. The battle over what falls under the jurisdiction of the
Clean Water Act and thus what requires a dredge and fill permit has
been hotly debated since the implementation of the Act. From the Rivers
and Harbors Act’s goal of protecting navigability to the Clean Water
Act’s goal of protecting “waters of the United States,” the definition of
“waters” has always been murky. Through case law and scientific
advancements, the main concern today has evolved into the protection
of the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of the waters of the
United States. Since the entire authority for the Clean Water Act rests
upon Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, the regulation of
intrastate waterways or non-navigable waters creates a great deal of
confusion for the public.

22

Worth, supra note 11, at 608 (citing Gross & Stelcen, at 8).
Worth, supra note 11, at 608 (citing Jerome G. Rose, Legal Foundations of
Environmental Planning 323 (1983)).
24
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 Permits for Dredged or Fill Material. (this is the
codification of the Clean Water Act Section 404 program).
23
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ii. Major Cases
Three major Supreme Court cases, United States v. Riverside
Bayview, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), and Rapanos v. United States, track the
judicial development of the definition of “waters of the United States.”
The most recent of the three, Rapanos, helped spur the change in the
definition of “waters of the United States” even though it contains a
plurality opinion with several different viewpoints.
1. Riverside Bayview
In United States v. Riverside Bayview, the Court first referenced the
“significant nexus” idea. The case focused on the Corps’ application of
the Clean Water Act to include jurisdiction over “freshwater wetlands”
within the meaning of “waters of the United States.”25 At the time, the
Corps defined freshwater wetlands as:
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas. 26

The respondent, Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., owned eighty
acres of marshland near the shore of Lake St. Clair.27 As a developer,
Riverside placed fill materials on the marshland in preparation of the
construction of a housing development. 28 The Corps of Engineers,
however, quickly sued to enjoin Riverside from filling the marshland
without permission from the Corps, as the marsh was considered an
adjacent wetland to navigable water.29
The district court granted the injunction, holding that the portion of
Riverside’s property that was less than 575.5 feet above sea level was a
25

See Micah Adkison, The Significant Nexus Test: Why the Waters of the United
States Are So Murky, 1 Oil & Gas, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 487, 492 (2016); see
also 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985).
26
Id. at 493; (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1979)).
27
Id; (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 124
(1985).
28
Id.
29
Id.
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wetland subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction. 30 When Riverside
appealed, the appellate court remanded the case for the consideration of
the effect of more recent amendments to the Clean Water Act added in
1977. 31 The district court, however, found that the property was a
wetland within the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction. 32 Riverside then
appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision because the semiaquatic
characteristics of the property “were not the result of frequent flooding
by the nearby navigable waters.”33 Essentially, the Sixth Circuit implied
that the wetlands were not jurisdictional because they did not flood often
enough.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the Sixth Circuit’s decision. 34 Primarily, the Court disagreed with the
Sixth Circuit’s standard that “frequent flooding” from the adjacent
navigable water signified that the wetland was under Clean Water Act
jurisdiction.35 The Court noted that it can be difficult to determine “the
point at which water ends and land begins,” but that the district court’s
findings were not erroneous because the property was “characterized by
the presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for
growth and reproduction . . . the source of the saturated soil conditions
on the property was ground water [and . . . the] property was adjacent to
a body of navigable water [in that the] saturated soil conditions and
wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of respondent’s
property to . . . a navigable waterway.” 36 The Court essentially focused
on the fact that the property contained certain wetland-specific
vegetation, not that the property contained water at all times.
The Court justified its decision by looking at Congress’ intent in
defining “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.” 37 By
defining the term so broadly, the Court agreed that the Clean Water Act
did not necessarily require “navigability” per se in order to find
30

Id.; (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 125).
Adkison, supra note 26, at 493. The changes from 1975 to 1977 eliminated the
use of the phrase “periodic inundation.” Id. at 124.
32
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S at 125.
33
Adkison, supra note 26, at 493; (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S at
125).
34
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S at 126.
35
Id at 129.
36
Id. at 130-31.
37
Id. at 133.
31
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jurisdiction.38 Further, since the purpose of the Corps’ authority was “a
legislative attempt to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” the Court easily concluded
that Congress intended for the definition of “waters” to be broadly
construed.39 Thus, the Court concluded that since Riverside’s property
was a wetland that “actually abuts” on a navigable water, the Corps and
the EPA’s jurisdiction over the property was reasonable.40
2. SWANCC
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC), the
Court dealt with the “Migratory Bird Rule.” The Migratory Bird Rule
attempted to pull isolated waters into Clean Water Act jurisdiction
solely if the waters “are or would be used as habitat by birds protected
by Migratory Bird Treaties [or by] migratory birds which cross state
lines.”41 After fifteen years of using this as a means of Clean Water Act
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court heard the issue in 2001.
In SWANCC, a group of suburban municipalities “united in an
effort to locate and develop a disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid
waste.” 42 SWANCC chose a location that comprised of a sand and
gravel mining site that was abandoned around 1960. Further, the site had
“[given] way to a successful stage forest . . . [and] a scattering of
permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size.” 43 The Corps initially
said that it did not have jurisdiction over the site, but changed that
determination after knowledge that migratory birds had been observed at
the site.44 Despite SWANCC’s various alternative plans to mitigate the
damages and preserve the site for the birds, the Corps still refused to
issue any dredge or fill permit under the Clean Water Act.45 The issue
was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, where SWANCC argued that the
Corps exceeded its authority by claiming jurisdiction over “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters based on the presence of migratory
38

Id.
Id. at 133.
40
Id. at 134-35.
41
Adkison, supra note 26, at 494; citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41206-01 (1986).
42
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159, at 162-63.
43
Id. at 163.
44
Id. at 164.
45
Id. at 165.
39
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birds and in the alternative, that Congress lacked the power under the
Commerce Clause to grant such regulatory jurisdiction.”46 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, ruled in favor of the Corps.
In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted that by
enacting the Clean Water Act, “Congress chose to recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to [regulate]
pollution . . . and use . . . of land and water resources, and to consult
with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this
chapter.” 47 Further, the Court interpreted the Riverside holding as
requiring a “significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable
waters.’” 48 The SWANCC case was distinguished from Riverside
Bayview, as SWANCC involved wetlands that were not adjacent to
bodies of open waters.
First, the Court noted that allowing expansion of the Corps’
authority “over ponds and mudflats falling within the Migratory Bird
Rule would result in a significant impingement of States’ traditional and
primary power over land and water use.”49 Ultimately, the Court refused
to defer to the Corps’ interpretation since such a broad interpretation of
the Clean Water Act would “alter the federal-state framework by
permitting federal encroachment upon traditional state power” and the
Act was not supported by a “clear indication that Congress intended that
result.” 50 This case made clear that the navigability factor is still
important in determining whether water is subject to jurisdiction of the
Act.51
3. Rapanos
The most recent and most influential case on Clean Water Act
jurisdiction is Rapanos v. United States. In a plurality, 4-1-4 opinion,
Rapanos essentially created two different tests for determining “waters
of the United States.”
Mr. Rapanos, without obtaining any permit, backfilled a wetland on
his property that was described as “land with sometimes-saturated soil
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id. at 166-67.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 172-73.
Adkison, supra note 26, at 496.
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conditions . . . [lying] 11 to 20 miles [from the nearest body of water].”52
The district court found that Mr. Rapanos was liable for violating the
Clean Water Act because the wetlands were adjacent to waters of the
United States and thus the Corps properly claimed jurisdiction. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision based on the
notion that the federal government has jurisdiction over lands with
“hydrologic connections to the nearby ditches or drains, or to remote
navigable waters.”53 However, the Supreme Court rejected this analysis
and articulated two different rationales, one in the plurality and one in
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
In the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia complained that the
“hydrologic connection” analysis was too overreaching. Instead, Scalia
proposed a more plain language analysis, as he focused on the idea that
the Clean Water Act authorizes jurisdiction over waters, not dry land.54
Further, Scalia argued that a water of the United States should be
defined as “a relatively permanent body of water connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters.55 Scalia also added that the Corps
should only have jurisdiction over wetlands that have “a continuous
surface connection with [a water of the United States], making it
difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’
begins.”56 Aligning with Scalia’s typical preference for plain language,
the opinion scolded the idea of regulating “lands” as “waters,” even
referencing things as simple as dictionary definitions of those words.
Joining the holding but writing his own approach, Kennedy’s
concurrence attaches isolated waters by their significant nexus to the
physical, chemical, and biological integrity of a navigable water, if such
a nexus exists. Kennedy essentially took the phrase “significant nexus”
from the SWANCC case and expounded upon it. First, Kennedy
disagreed with Scalia’s idea that a body of water must be relatively
permanent in order to be jurisdictional. According to Kennedy, this
requirement would exclude “torrents [of water] thundering at irregular
intervals through otherwise dry channels.” 57 Further, Kennedy argued
52

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719-720 (The case also involved other petitioners, but the
circumstances of Mr. Rapanos most clearly illustrate the issue. This does not affect the
legal analysis in any way).
53
Id. at 715.
54
Id. at 731.
55
Id. at 742.
56
Id. at 742.
57
Id. at 769-70.
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that Scalia’s requirement of a “continuous surface connection” was not
supported by Riverside, as “the connection might well exist only during
floods.”58
In fairness, Kennedy also noted that “mere hydrologic connection
should not suffice in all cases, . . . [a]bsent some measure of the
significance of the connection for downstream water quality [of
traditionally navigable waters].” 59 Consequently, Kennedy maintained
that the word “navigable” should still be given some effect, noting
“when . . . wetlands’ effects on water quality are speculative or
insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the
statutory term ‘navigable waters.’” 60 Perhaps most eloquently,
Kennedy’s test required that “the wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”61 After Rapanos, courts
vary in their use of Scalia’s and Kennedy’s tests.62
A. The New Clean Water Rule
i. What the Rule Does
After decades of confusion, the EPA decided to create a clear-cut
rule for defining “waters of the United States.” Adopted in August 2015,
the Rule came with large ambitions, just like the Clean Water Act itself.
The EPA argues that its new rule clearly defines and protects tributaries
that impact the health of downstream waters, provides certainty in how
far safeguards extend to nearby waters, protects the nations regional
water treasures, focuses on streams instead of ditches, maintains the
status of waters within the Municipal Separate Storm Sewer system, and
reduces the use of case-specific analysis of waters.63
58

Id. at 773.
Id. at 784.
60
Id. at 779-80.
61
Id.
62
Until the litigation of the Rule is complete, courts apply either of the tests in
Rapanos. If a water meets the criteria for Scalia’s adjacent and relatively permanent test
or Kennedy’s “significant nexus test,” it can be brought into Clean Water Act
jurisdiction.
63
What
the
Clean
Water
Rule
Does,
available
at
https://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/what-clean-water-rule-does.
59

2017]IT'S ALL DOWNHILL FROM HERE: HOW THE NATION'S
DISPUTE WITH CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION IS SOLVED 19
ii. What the Rule Does Not Do
Anticipating the strong opposition, the EPA also pinpoints some
important things that the Rule does not do. The EPA argues that the
Rule does not: “protect any types of waters that have not historically
been covered by the Clean Water Act; add any new requirements for
agriculture; interfere with or change private property rights; regulate
most ditches; change policy on irrigation or water transfers; address land
use; cover erosional features such as gullies, rills and non-wetland
swales; or include groundwater, shallow subsurface flow and tile
drains.”64 These distinctions are important as they address many of the
irrational fears of the public.
B. The Rule is Stayed
As soon as the Rule was promulgated, the EPA was met with
numerous lawsuits. Farmers, businesses, and landowners filed suits to
stop the imposition of the new rule. With numerous lawsuits rising
across the country, the lawsuits were consolidated into the Sixth
Circuit. 65 As of December 2016, the case is still pending before the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, awaiting a decision on the merits.
While numerous suits arose in various circuits, the suits generally
contain common allegations. Most suits allege that the Rule is an
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful abuse of discretion by the
EPA. In alleging this, most opponents attack the scientific validity, the
“logical outgrowth” requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act,
the Rule’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, and the Rule’s
validity under the “clear statement canon.”66

64

What the Clean Water Rule Does Not Do, available at
https://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/what-clean-water-rule-does-not-do.
65
See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (2015).
66
Id. (Eighteen states alleging that the rule is contrary to the Rapanos opinion,
violates the logical outgrowth requirement); see also Complaint and Petition for
Review, State of Texas v. EPA, 2016 WL 686436 (2016) (lawsuit with Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi alleging that the Rule violates the Commerce Clause and the
Clear Statement Canon).
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II. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST IS SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND
A. Waters are “Fluid”
By essentially adopting Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test,
the EPA and the Corps chose the most scientifically sound analysis.
While many in the general public see the Rule as a broad overreach of
the federal government without justification, the EPA took extreme
caution in developing the Rule on a scientific basis, including the review
of 1,200 scientific articles.
While no one usually objects to the regulation of America’s rivers,
the regulation of streams and wetlands is hotly contested. However,
streams and wetlands “affect the amounts and types of materials that are
or are not delivered to downstream waters, ultimately contributing to the
structure and function of those waters.”67 Although the Clean Water Act
traditionally regulated interstate, navigable waters, the Rule clarifies
protections that guard the scientific structure of all waters of the United
States. Waters are fluid; no pun intended. Water moves, flows, and
interconnects. Accordingly, the Rule is necessary as “the structure and
function of rivers are highly dependent on the constituent materials
stored in and transported through them.” 68 Specifically, streams and
wetlands often transport materials that are “physical, chemical, or
biological entit[ies]” into rivers; these materials can include “water, heat
energy, sediment, wood, organic matter, nutrients, chemical
contaminants, and organisms” that all originate outside of the river.69
B. Function of Wetlands
To understand how physical, chemical, and biological connections
between streams and wetlands and downstream waters influence river
systems, the scientific reports considered five functions: source, sink,
refuge, lag, and transformation. 70 Broadly, a river system’s function

67

Technical Support for the Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the
United States at 137, available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201505/documents/technical_support_document_for_the_clean_water_rule_1.pdf.
68
Id. at 136.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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depends on the biological connectivity among the system’s populations
of aquatic and semiaquatic organisms.71
The most common objection to the Rule, and essentially what
Scalia’s Rapanos opinion warned, is that the Clean Water Act may now
regulate “dry” lands. While this fear may seem substantiated, truly “dry”
lands are not covered by the Rule. Some wetlands may become dry
during certain seasons of the year, but these lands are not disconnected
from the quality of downstream waters. For example, riverbeds or
streambeds that temporarily dry up are often “used by aquatic organisms
that are specially adapted to wet and dry conditions. . . .” 72
Consequently, these temporary dry areas “can affect nutrient dynamics
of downstream waters due to microbial activity, increased oxygen
availability, and inputs of terrestrial sources of organic matter and
nutrients.” 73 To say that a piece of land that scientifically will affect
water quality of other waters is not jurisdictional simply does not line up
with the goal of the Act. Again, it must be factually shown that there
will be an effect.
C. Human Intervention
Although the effect of wetlands or streams on river systems may
not seem noticeable, the effect of these smaller waters on larger river
networks is usually only noticeable after some human intervention.74
This is exactly what the Clean Water Act and the new Rule hope to
prevent. The strongest human impact on the water system is likely the
impact made through wetland drainage. 75 Studies show that in the
United States, “states have lost more than half their original wetlands,
with some losing more than 90%.” 76 This is an issue that must be
stopped. A dictionary definition of what is water and what is land is not
a sufficient justification to deplete America’s wetlands.77
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Id. at 140.
Id. at 145.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 153.
75
Id. at 154.
76
Id. See also Darryl Fears, Study Says U.S. Can’t Keep Up with Loss of
Wetlands, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2013) (referencing the loss of 360,000 acres of
freshwater and coastal wetlands from 2004 to 2009).
77
See Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
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III. THE RULE IS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR OTHERWISE UNLAWFUL
With the strong scientific studies implemented prior to the Rule’s
creation, the hope was that the public would consider the strong
scientific reasons for support of the Rule. However, the numerous
lawsuits filed against the implementation of the Rule provide some
common arguments in opposition. First, many of the newest lawsuits
argue that the Rule is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise unlawful because it is contrary to Supreme Court precedent,
violates the Administrative Procedure Act, and violates the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.78
A. The Rule Does Not Violate the “Logical Outgrowth” Standard of
the APA
One of the most common objections to the Rule is that the final rule
differed from the proposed rule in a manner that violates the “logical
outgrowth” standard under the Administrative Procedure Act.79
i. Logical Outgrowth Requirement
The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to provide a
“general notice of proposed rulemaking” and to provide “interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through
submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .” 80 Case law
determined further tests for this requirement, noting that an agency’s
final rule may differ from its proposed rule only to the extent that the
final rule is a “logical outgrowth” of the rule that was originally
proposed for comment. 81 Further, a final rule is a logical outgrowth of a
78

See generally In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804; see also State of Texas v. EPA,
Complaint and Petition for Review, U.S. Dist. Court for the Southern District of Texas
(2015). These lawsuits opposing the Rule were consolidated into the Sixth Circuit. The
litigation is currently stalled due to issues regarding jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit to
hear all the opposition to the Rule. In re EPA includes the complaints of Ohio,
Michigan, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, West
Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin.
79
In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 807 (6th 2015).
80
5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)—(c).
81
Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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proposed rule only to the extent that interested parties “‘should have
anticipated’ that the change was possible, and thus reasonably should
have filed their comments on the subject during the notice-and-comment
period.”82
Specifically, opponents to the rule argue that the proposed rule, “on
which interested persons were invited to comment, did not include any
proposed distance limitations in its use of terms like ‘adjacent waters’
and ‘significant nexus.’”83
In both the proposed rule and the final Rule, waters that are
“adjacent” to traditional waters and tributaries and impoundments of
traditional waters are “waters of the United States.” 84 Additionally,
“adjacent waters” include “neighboring waters” in both the proposed
rule and the final Rule. 85 The proposed rule, however, defined
“neighboring waters” in terms of a hydrological connection. More
specifically, the proposed rule defined “neighboring waters” as “waters
with a shallow subsurface hydrologic connection or confined surface
hydrologic connection to such a jurisdictional water.”86 In the proposed
rule, the justification for regulating “adjacent waters” was based on the
“significant nexus” to traditional waters because such adjacent waters
“significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
those waters.”87
The final Rule, however, defines “neighboring waters” in terms of
distance to traditional waters, impoundments, and tributaries. 88
Opponents argue that this change in the definition of “adjacent” from a
hydrological connection to distance alone could not have been
anticipated by the interested parties during the comment period and
therefore was not a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule.89

82

Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(quoting Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
83
Id.
84
See Proposed Rule at 22, 260; see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5) (2015).
85
Id.
86
See Proposed Rule at 22,261, 22,271.
87
Id. at 22,260.
88
See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(2) (2015).
89
See In re EPA; see also State of Texas, State of Louisiana, and State of
Mississippi v. EPA, Complaint and Petition for Review, at 20. (2015).
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ii. Foreseeability and Deference of the EPA
The argument that the final Rule is not a logical outgrowth of the
proposed rule is a failing argument. The numbers used in the final Rule
are a result of scientific data; particularly the numbers stating that waters
within the 100 year floodplain of a traditional navigable water or waters
within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark.
These hard numbers do not automatically subject these waters to Clean
Water Act jurisdiction. Instead, if a water does not otherwise meet the
definition of adjacency, the water can be evaluated on a case-specific
basis to determine if there is a significant nexus, if the water is within a
100 year floodplain or within 4,000 feet of the high tide line.90
As discussed in the Science Report provided by the EPA, wetlands
and open waters within floodplains are “physically, chemically and
biologically integrated with rivers via functions that improve
downstream water quality, including the temporary storage and
deposition of channel-forming sediment and woody debris, temporary
storage of local ground water that supports baseflow in rivers, and
transformation and transport of stored organic matter.”91 For the sake of
having a clearer and easier Rule, the EPA adopted the 100 year mark as
the limit for whether a floodplain should be considered on a case-bycase basis when it does not otherwise meet the definition of adjacent.
As for the 4,000 foot mark, “experience and expertise indicate that
there are individual waters out to 4,000 feet where the science
demonstrates that they, either alone or in combination with similarly
situated waters, often have a significant effect on downstream waters.”92
These numbers simply align with the goal of the Clean Water Act and
do not automatically create any government overreach. Even if a
property is within 4,000 feet of the high water mark or within the 100year flood plain of a navigable water, the property still must be analyzed
to determine if a significant nexus exists. If it is clear that no significant
nexus exists, then the property will be exempt from the Act’s
jurisdiction.

90
91
92

See supra note 68, at 349.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 353.
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B. The Rule Does Not Violate the Commerce Clause
The Clean Water Act was originally enacted pursuant to Congress’s
authority to regulate interstate commerce. One common objection to the
final Rule is that the Rule will subject to jurisdiction thousands of miles
of intrastate waters that have no substantial effect on interstate
commerce.93 Under Kennedy’s reasoning in Rapanos, jurisdiction over
waters that are not traditionally navigable depends upon the existence of
a significant nexus. 94 The final Rule faces many Commerce Clause
challenges based specifically on the definitions of “other waters,” the
scope of the term “adjacent,” and the construction of the term
“tributaries.”
i. Interpretation of “Other Waters”
The issue that opponents take with the definition of “other waters”
is rooted in the elimination of the specific list of “other waters.”95 While
eliminating the list of other waters, the new Rule replaced it with the
case-by-case significant nexus test.96 However, the Rule limits the types
of “other waters” that can be subject to a case-specific significant nexus
analysis to two types. The first type includes five subcategories: prairie
potholes, Carolina bays and Delmarva bays, pocosins, western vernal
pools, and Texas coastal prairie wetlands. The second type includes
“waters located in whole or in part within the 100-year floodplain of a
traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas and
within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or [ordinary high water mark] of a
jurisdictional water.” Although it somewhat expands what can be
included as waters of the United States with the significant nexus

93

See Complaint and Petition for Review at 29.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780.
95
Worth, supra note 11, at 622.
96
Id. See also 33 C.F.R. § 228.3 (2015) (The old definition of waters of the
United States included “All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, ‘wetlands,’ sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such
waters: (1) which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational
or other purposes; or (2) from which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or (3) which are used by or could be used for industrial
purposes by industries in interstate commerce.”).
94
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analysis, the Rule still limits the types of other waters to two specific
categories.97
During the notice and comment period for the Rule, the National
Association of Home Builders (NAHB) argued that the agencies’
jurisdiction is bound by Congress’ authority to regulate “channels” of
commerce and that it does not extend to activities that “substantially
affect” interstate commerce.98 The NAHB also argued that the Rule’s
implementation of a case-by-case significant nexus analysis violates the
Commerce Clause.99 Opponents also allege that allowing the agencies to
use scientific evidence on case-by-case determinations will give the
agencies enough leeway to essentially regulate everything as “waters of
the United States.” These objections rely on the Rapanos case and the
idea that Rapanos limited the regulation of “marginal waters or
wetlands” to those that function as “channels” of interstate commerce
and does not allow for regulation of waters that may simply have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Further, opponents argue that
the SWANCC affirms their claim because the Court held that permitting
“respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats”
because they may have substantial effects on interstate commerce
“would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and
primary power over land and water use.”100
Following the Lopez decision in 1995, courts have further clarified
the standards of Commerce Clause review.101 Specifically in the D.C.
Circuit, courts have held that the Commerce Clause analysis should
consider any available scientific evidence on the issue.102 In the NAHB
case, the D.C. Circuit considered the question of whether the Commerce
Clause authority permitted the prohibition of taking an endangered
species of fly under the Endangered Species Act.103 The court “relied on
scientific evidence to establish the fly’s importance to commercial
actors.”104
Similar to the holding in previous Supreme Court cases, the EPA
could use scientific evidence in case-by-case examinations to determine
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Worth, supra note 11, at 623. (2016).
Id. at 626.
Id.
See SWANC; see Worth, supra note 11, at 627; see NAHB Comment at 24-28.
Worth, supra note 11, at 612. (2016).
See National Ass’n. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d at 1043.
Id. at 1054.
Worth, supra note 11, at 612.
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whether or not “other waters” satisfy the significant nexus test. In fact,
case-specific, individualized analysis is the preferred manner of
evaluating Commerce Clause jurisdiction.105
Further, regulating “other waters” with a “significant nexus” to
navigable waters likely qualifies as regulating a “channel” of interstate
commerce, similar to the NAHB case. 106 The power of Congress to
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce is limited
to activities that are economic in nature, while the regulation of
“channels” of interstate commerce is more free. However, the rule
focuses on the degree to which the “other water” affects the chemical,
physical, or biological integrity of the navigable-in-fact water.107 Thus,
the Rule essentially focuses on ways in which the “other water” could
interfere with a way that navigable water is used; this is reasonably
described as controlling the interference with or the misuse of a channel
of interstate commerce.108 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the
issue of whether the Commerce power allowed Congress to regulate the
flow of polluted water from privately owned wetlands to an adjacent
roadside ditch and into a navigable river. 109 The court held that
Congress’ authority indeed included the authority to regulate channels
of interstate commerce and the channel’s use or misuse.110
ii. Interpretation of “Adjacent”
While the previous rule provided that “waters of the United States”
includes “wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this
section,” the new Rule describes adjacent waters as “bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring.” 111 Further, water will be considered
“neighboring” if it is: (1) located within 100 feet of the ordinary high
water mark of a jurisdictional water; (2) located in whole or in part
within the 100-year flood-plain and is not more than 1500 feet from the
105

Worth, supra note 11, at 629; citing U.S. v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 658 (9th
Cir. 2009) (noting that “Commerce Clause analysis has never been fungible; it has been
case-specific”).
106
Worth, supra note 11, at 631.
107
Id. at 629.
108
Id. at 631.
109
Id. at 630; citing U.S. v. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 701-702.
110
Id. at 706.
111
Worth, supra note 11, at 623.
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ordinary high water mark of a jurisdictional water; or (3) located in
whole or in part within 1500 feet of the high tide line of a jurisdictional
water and within 1500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of the Great
Lakes.”112 Therefore, adjacent waters that are: bordering, contiguous, or
within specified boundaries to a jurisdictional water are now considered
jurisdictional.113 Specifically, if the adjacent water is located within the
100-year floodplain, but between 1500 and 4000 feet from the ordinary
high water mark, the water will be considered jurisdictional if it satisfies
the significant nexus test.114 While the old rule limited adjacent waters
to wetlands, the new Rule clearly expands the eligible waters that could
be considered adjacent.
Objections to this potential expansion were brought during the
comment period on the Rule. Opponents raised the issue that this new
definition of adjacent would “capture every open in a floodplain and
riparian area, despite whether they are isolated or have a significant
connection to downstream waters. . .”115 The opponents basically argued
that the new definition would expand Clean Water Act jurisdiction to a
“virtually limitless” category.116
Finding that adjacent waters are categorically jurisdictional due to
their significant nexus to navigable-in-fact waters, however, is a
perfectly permissible application of “adjacency” under the Commerce
Clause. In short, this is because waters within these proximity limits
usually possess the necessary connection to downstream waters and
function as a larger system to protect the chemical, physical, or
biological integrity of navigable waters. Any other waters with a less
obvious hydrological connection, however, must still pass a “significant
nexus” scientific analysis in order to be jurisdictional. Landowners can
rest in the protection that not every hydrologic connection will bring
about Clean Water Act jurisdiction. Like in Rapanos, a hydrologic
connection may fail a significant nexus analysis because “the connection
may be too insubstantial for the hydrologic linkage to establish the
required nexus with navigable waters as traditionally understood.”117

112
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114
115
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Id. at 624.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 627.
Id.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 784-85.

2017]IT'S ALL DOWNHILL FROM HERE: HOW THE NATION'S
DISPUTE WITH CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION IS SOLVED 29
This new consideration of the significant nexus between adjacent
waters and navigable-in-fact waters should eliminate any need for the
EPA or the Corps to show any separate Commerce Clause jurisdiction.
When the waters are “evaluated as a single landscape unit with regard to
their effect on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” on
navigable-in-fact waters, that are undoubtedly channels of interstate
commerce, there is no longer a need for any Commerce Clause
debate.118
iii. Interpretation of “Tributaries”
Similar to the interpretations of “other waters” and “adjacent,” the
interpretation of tributaries is based on the scientific impacts that
tributaries can have on navigable waters.119 The old rule was somewhat
vague with regards to tributaries of navigable waters. The old rule
limited the regulation of tributaries to “tributaries of waters identified in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section,” but did not actually define
the term “tributaries.”120 Therefore, the old rule limited jurisdiction to
basic tributaries of traditionally navigable waters. The new Rule,
however, defines a tributary as “a water that contributes flow, either
directly or through another water . . . to a [traditionally navigable] water
. . . that is characterized by the presence of the physical indicators of a
bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark.”121
Like the definitions of “other waters” and “adjacent,” the new
definition of “tributaries” drew immediate opposition in regards to the
Commerce Clause. In particular, the National Cattlemen’s Beef
Association argued during the comment period that the new Rule’s
definition of tributary violated the Commerce Clause because the Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County case implied that allowing
agencies to regulate contributing flow through any type of water source
is a violation of the Commerce Clause.122 The NCBA’s argument was
based on the idea that the Supreme Court struck down the Migratory
Bird Rule in SWANCC because the rule took the idea of navigability

118

David Peterson, Coastal Prot. & Restoration Auth., EPA/Corps of Engineers
“Waters of the U.S. Regulation Update.
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Worth, supra note 11, at 624.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 628.
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completely out of the regulation, and that the new definition of
“tributary” effectively does the same thing.123
Once again, the argument against the definition of “tributary” as a
violation of the Commerce Clause based on the ruling of SWANCC fails.
The new Rule considers a “tributary” to be a waterbody that contributes
flow to any navigable-in-fact water. 124 Opponents argue that this
definition violates the Commerce Clause in the same manner as the
“migratory bird rule” from SWANCC.125 However, the Migratory Bird
Rule was struck down in SWANCC because it too far disconnected
from an “activity that ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.” 126
The distinction between the Migratory Bird Rule and the definition of
tributaries under the new Rule is clear. The new definition of “tributary”
allows for federal regulation of non-navigable waters that flow into
navigable-in-fact waters. 127 This distinction is clear because the flowconnectivity factually affects the navigable waters in a chemical,
physical, and biological manner. Birds landing on a pond does not
actually affect the navigability or availability of the water in any way.
Multiple circuits have created precedent for this type of regulation.
In United States v. Robinson, the Eleventh Circuit held that it is
“well established that Congress intended to regulate the discharge of
pollutants into all waters that may eventually lead to waters affecting
interstate commerce.”128 Additionally, the Supreme Court held in Royal
Rock Co-Op that the Commerce Clause authorizes the regulation of
activities that interfere with channels of interstate commerce. 129
Therefore, after the Supreme Court established that the Commerce
Clause extends to activities that interfere with channels of interstate
commerce, Robinson signified that flow connectivity falls within the
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Id.
Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,058 (June 29, 2015).
125
NCBA Comment at 5, n. 11.
126
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 193.
127
Worth, supra note 11, at 635.
128
U.S. v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2007).
129
Worth, supra note 11, at 635 (citing U.S. v. Royal Rock Co-Op, 307 U.S. 533,
544 (1939).
124
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category of “affecting interstate commerce” if it is regulated to preserve
overall water quality.130
C. The Rule Does Not Violate the Clear Statement Canon
Another common argument against the Rule is that the phrase
“waters of the United States” does not constitute such a clear and
manifest statement.131 Courts traditionally expect “a ‘clear and manifest’
statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into
traditional state authority.”132 The issue here is whether the Rule violates
federal authority in an unprecedented way. As previously discussed with
regard to the Commerce Clause, implementing a rule to preserve the
good of all “waters of the United States” is not an unprecedented
intrusion into state authority. The federal government has a clear interest
in protecting all of the nation’s interconnected waterways.
IV. SCALIA’S PLURALITY TEST IS INSUFFICIENT
Although the stay of the Rule does not necessarily create an
emergency situation for the waters of the United States, the long-term
solution is to fully adopt the new Rule. To simply maintain the status
quo or use Scalia’s plurality opinion to determine jurisdiction is not a
legally sound way to protect America’s waters.
A. Scalia’s Test is Still Unclear
Riverside Bayview rejected the proposition that wetlands must
contain moisture from neighboring covered waters.133 Further, Riverside
Bayview was not limited to the concept of adjacent wetlands, but had a
broader focus on “wetlands’ `significant effects on water quality and the
aquatic ecosystem.’”134
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Id. (citing Royal Rock Co-Op, 307 U.S. at 544; Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1215)
(“Congress intended to regulate the discharge of pollutants into all waters that may
eventually lead to waters affecting interstate commerce . . . .”).
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See State of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi v. EPA.
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Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738.
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Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121(1985).
134
Id.

32

ENVIRONMENTAL AND EARTH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County interpreted the Clean
Water Act to require a “significant nexus” with “navigable waters,”
which is broader than the surface-water connection.135
Scalia’s interpretation of the statutory text gives insufficient
deference to Congress’ purposes in enacting the Clean Water Act and to
the authority of the agency in implementing the statutory mandates.136
B. Scalia’s Test Does Not Coincide With the Goals of the Act
In sum, Kennedy agrees with the Rapanos dissent that “an
intermittent flow can constitute a stream.”137 Kennedy also agrees, “that
the Corps can reasonably interpret the Act to cover the paths of such
impermanent streams.”138 Kennedy states that the plurality’s conclusion
that “navigable waters may not be intermittent … is unsound.” 139
Kennedy rejects the “plurality’s second limitation – exclusion of
wetlands lacking a continuous surface connection to other jurisdictional
waters.” 140 To adopt Scalia’s idea of “relatively permanent” waters
would likely exclude thousands of miles of small streams and wetlands
that have substantial impacts on America’s water quality. While the
three major cases seem contradictory, Kennedy’s concurrence, which
establishes the significant nexus test, is not contrary to the previous
decisions of the Court and creates the easiest, most thorough way to
ensure water quality.
V. THE NEW RULE IS LESS OVERREACHING THAN ANY PREVIOUS
ALTERNATIVE
A. The Court Abandoned the Purely Economic Commerce Justification
Opponents do not claim that navigable waters do not affect
interstate commerce. To do so would be a frivolous argument. However,
opponents still contend that the federal government’s regulation of
isolated waters or wetlands is an overreach of federal authority. Similar
135

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
136
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715.
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Id.
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to the Commerce Clause argument, regulating only the isolated waters
and wetlands that can negatively affect the physical, chemical, and
biological integrity of the nation’s navigable waters seems to clearly be
necessary in protecting navigable waters as a whole. Again, a farmer
with a pond has nothing to worry about, unless extreme circumstances
existed where his pond could affect the integrity of some navigable
water. This is the essence of the significant nexus test. With the
significant nexus, there is no need to decide if a landowner’s isolated
water affects commerce; instead, the test is to see if the isolated water
has a significant nexus to a navigable water, as such water clearly falls
under commerce clause jurisdiction.
i.

Issue in SWANCC was a Stretch of Authority

If the public is upset about federal overreach, the idea to be upset
about is the idea crushed in SWANCC. In that case, the Supreme Court
struck down the ability to grab jurisdiction of isolated waters and
wetlands by saying that migratory birds used the waters, and migratory
birds are hunted, etc. which affects interstate commerce. This sweeping
grab of power is a reason to be upset; fortunately, both Scalia’s and
Kennedy’s opinions in Rapanos further abandoned this rationale. With
the new Rule, the EPA is moving in a direction that should please all
parties involved while maintaining the true spirit of the Clean Water
Act.
B. Jurisdictional Determinations Can Now Be Challenged in Federal
District Court
While moving to ensure the protection of navigable waters, the
federal government is also restructuring the process for citizens dealing
with a Clean Water Act dispute. In the summer of 2016, the Supreme
Court decided in Hawkes that jurisdictional determinations under the
Clean Water Act can be appealed directly in a federal court.141
i.

Approved JDs Constitute a Final Agency Decision

The Clean Water Act, at its core, prohibits the discharge of
pollutants into waters of the United States, unless a permit is obtained.
141

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes, Co., 136 S.Ct. 1807 (2016).
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For the EPA to implement Clean Water Act regulations on a property,
the EPA must first obtain a jurisdictional determination. This
determination examines the property to see if the water or wetland in
dispute actually has a “significant nexus to navigable waters.” If the
EPA determines that the water is within its jurisdiction, a battle usually
begins between the landowner and the EPA.
One major issue with the Clean Water Act is the citizen’s ability to
obtain judicial review. The EPA’s regulations typically spur disputes,
particularly when it comes to whether a landowner’s property
constitutes “waters of the United States.” However, federal courts may
review an agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. 142
Specifically, federal courts may review an action as long as that action is
final, not specifically made unreviewable by statute, and not wholly
committed to the agency’s discretion.143
In the Hawkes case, the Corps issued a jurisdictional determination
stating that property owned by the peat mining company in Minnesota
contained wetlands that had a significant nexus to navigable waters,
specifically the Red River of the North.144 The mine owners filed a suit
challenging this determination under the Administrative Procedure
Act. 145 However, the district court ruled that it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction because the jurisdictional determination was not a
“final agency action.” 146 The mine owners appealed to the Eighth
Circuit, which reversed the district court’s decision. 147 The Supreme
Court, seeing the importance of the distinction, granted certiorari and
heard the case in the spring of 2016. On May 31, 2016, the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision that an
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See 5 U.S.C. 704. (Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as
otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the
purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an
application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is
inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority).
143
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
144
See generally Hawkes Co.,136 S.Ct. 1807 (2016).
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Id.
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approved jurisdictional determination is a “final agency decision.” 148
With all eight justices in agreement, three concurrences were still
written.149 Most notably, Justice Kennedy argued that “the Court is right
to construe a [jurisdictional determination] as binding in light of the fact
that in many instances it will have a significant bearing on whether the
Clean Water Act comports with due process.” 150 Similarly, Justice
Kagan argued that jurisdictional determinations should be reviewable
because “legal consequences will flow” from the Corps’ determinations
in these disputes.151 In the midst of its surety over the issue, the Court
failed to discuss several other issues, including how this decision could
affect the Clean Water Rule.152
ii. The Hawkes Decision Should Coincide with the New Rule
The Court did not discuss how the Hawkes decision should apply to
the Rule, as the Rule was already stayed at the time of the Hawkes
decision. However, implementing both of these new rules would greatly
increase the reasonability of the whole dredge and fill permit process.
Once a landowner receives an approved jurisdiction determination
finding jurisdiction, the landowner can abandon the development plans,
seek a permit, spending large amounts of money that will never be
refunded, or proceed with the development at the risk of serious civil
and criminal penalties. Perhaps the Hawkes decision can ease the minds
of the Rule’s opponents. If the EPA wants jurisdiction over an isolated
water or wetland, it must show factually that the water or wetland has a
significant nexus to navigable waters. If the landowner disagrees, he is
not out of luck. The landowner should now be able to appeal the
decision directly to a federal court.
However, some argue that the Hawkes decision could be bad news
for the Rule. Larry Liebesman, a former Justice Department
environmental attorney, stated “The fact that the ruling was unanimous
148

Id.
See Hawkes, 136 S.Ct. 1807, 1817 (2016). (Justices Kennedy, Kagan, and
Ginsburg issued concurring opinions. This decision in this case was made after the
death of Justice Scalia, hence only eight justices.).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
See Hawkes at footnote 2 (Some justices were in disagreement that meeting
only the first prong of Bennett would suffice; nevertheless, the Court chose to delay that
issue and still made a unanimous decision for purposes of the overall issue).
149
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shows that even the liberal justices will not automatically defer to the
Obama administration’s Clean Water Act policy interpretations which
impact property rights. . . The ruling also suggests that the WOTUS rule
will likely face similar scrutiny should it reach the Court.”153 In contrast,
environmentalists disagreed with the reasoning in Hawkes. Jan
Goldman-Carter, of the National Wildlife Federation, argued that the
Corps’ process “will get even more cumbersome and time consuming” if
there is a requirement of individual case-by-case determinations with the
possibility of a lawsuit.154
VI. EPA’S LITIGATION ISSUE
A massive flux of lawsuits is nothing new for the EPA. Anytime
the EPA issues a new rule, it is almost always challenged as an arbitrary
and capricious abuse of discretion. While the recent litigation has
decided to consolidate the lawsuits into the Sixth Circuit, the court’s
decision is likely to be appealed regardless of the outcome. Based on the
long, complicated history of the Act’s jurisdiction, it is likely that the
Supreme Court will eventually grant certiorari for the issue. The
disputes and claims against the Rule will probably never stop until the
Supreme Court issues an opinion on the merits of the Clean Water Rule.
With the recent election of Donald Trump, the fate of the Rule and
the EPA as a whole has been questioned. President-elect Trump has a
history of openly opposing the EPA. Trump will undoubtedly select at
least one Supreme Court justice during his presidency, and probably
more. Accordingly, Trump’s election may be the biggest factor for the
fate of Clean Water Act jurisdiction in quite some time. Whenever the
Sixth Circuit makes its decision on the merits of the Rule, the vicious
cycle will inevitable carry the Rule all the way to the Supreme Court. By
that time, however, President-elect Trump may have appointed multiple
justices to the Court. Whether conservative or liberal, one has to
recognize that this possibility could drastically decrease the chances that
the Rule is upheld. By acknowledging the legal soundness of the Rule
and combining the application of the Hawkes, Co. case, however, the
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See Annie Snider, Supreme Court Ruling Means More Clean Water Act
Lawsuits
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31,
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Court can avoid the devastation of falling back to square one with
regards to Clean Water Act jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
By protecting streams and wetlands, the Rule protects the
communities downstream. Wetlands provide major benefits to
communities such as trapping floodwaters, recharging groundwater
supplies, filtering pollution, and providing habitats for wildlife. 155
Before formulating the Rule, the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers collaborated and utilized scientific experts. Specifically, the
EPA used a report containing more than 1,200 peer-reviewed, published
scientific studies showing that small streams and wetlands play a major
role in the health of larger downstream waterways. 156
While controversial, the impact of climate change makes the
upholding of the Rule even more essential.157 Much of the opposition to
the Rule claims that the new Rule is a major overreach of federal power.
The new Rule, however, is less overreaching than the idea presented in
SWANCC. Obtaining jurisdiction because of waterfowl that affect
interstate commerce is far more of a stretch than obtaining jurisdiction
because the scientific facts show that the isolated water affects the
physical, biological, or chemical integrity of an interstate, navigable
water.
After roughly forty years of confusion and litigation, the EPA and
the Corps adapted to the scientific advancements of today’s society in
determining a new, fair rule for Clean Water Act jurisdiction. With
particular focus on the Section 404 dredge and fill permits, it is
understandable why much of the public is concerned that the new Rule
would be an overreaching burden. The legal claims against the Rule,
however, should all fail. While the Sixth Circuit may be reaching a
decision soon, the issue will surely be brought again and eventually
settled by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Clean Water Rule is the most scientifically sound rule for
Clean Water Act jurisdiction that has ever been promulgated. Further,
the rule does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, the
Commerce Clause, or the Clear Statement Canon, as alleged in the
155
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pending lawsuits. If the Supreme Court wants to settle the issue, as it
surely will, the Court will have to grant certiorari for the looming
litigation that will follow the Sixth Circuit’s decision on the
consolidated lawsuits. Further, the Court could likely appease the public
outcry by aligning its recent decision in Hawkes Co. v. Army Corps
with the published Clean Water Rule, allowing landowners judicial
review of the Corps’ jurisdictional determinations on their property.
After the long evolution of Riverside Bayview, Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County, and Rapanos, the new Hawkes case should be
the nail in the coffin for the opposition, if the Court allows the decision
to apply to the new Clean Water Rule.

